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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his essay The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions,1 Don Langevoort 
accurately describes the state-of-play in a somewhat broken system of corporate governance 
in the context of business combinations (a.k.a. mergers and acquisitions or, as referenced 
here, “M&A”).  The law (in both its regulatory and enforcement forms), as described by 
Professor Langevoort, fails to effectively curb observed behavioral biases in the M&A 
transactional environment.  As a result, Professor Langevoort ultimately urges that law 
practice—rather than legal principles and constraints arising from legislation, regulation, and 
judicial review—holds the answer to important unresolved questions at the intersection of 
behavioral economics and corporate governance.  Specifically, he contends that: 
corporate law is about more than strategies of judicial or regulatory 
intervention.  The practice of corporate law and corporate governance—in 
which lawyers are centrally involved—requires a great deal of psychological 
as well as economic astuteness, and the rich body of behavioral M&A 
research can and should inform how deals are negotiated, structured and 
approved, even in setting of minimal judicial review.2 
He goes on to say that: 
[t]he most important message . . . applies to those individuals trying to 
manage the deal process in the shareholders‟ best interest.  Those 
individuals, including the lawyers, bankers, and accountants, should 
recognize the pressures driving members of the deal team and be 
demanding and critical, even when they genuinely believe in doing the deal.3 
Finally, consistent with the foregoing, he concludes that: 
the greatest use for this [behavioral] research is mainly for participants in 
the transactional process itself, who very much need to better understand 
                                                 
* College of Law Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law; J.D., New York 
University School of Law; A.B., Brown University.  Before beginning her law teaching career in 2000, Professor 
Heminway practiced law for almost 15 years at the Boston office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.  
Her practice involved business associations, securities regulation, and corporate finance matters, including 
business combination transactions. 
1 Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 65 
(2011). 
2 Id. at 76. 
3 Id. at 78.  
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not only that human nature poses a risk to the deal, but how, why, and 
under what circumstances there is reason to worry.4 
Some may find Professor Langevoort‟s conclusions in this regard obvious because 
legislative and regulatory rulemaking and judicial intervention have, indeed, proven 
unworkable, seemingly leaving only practical solutions on the table.  Others may find them 
counterintuitive in that flaws of human nature exist in both M&A dealmakers and those 
responsible for M&A practice, making it difficult for us to fathom how one may 
meaningfully check the behavioral biases of the other.  Both views may be valid critiques of 
the conclusions he draws in his essay.  So be it.  But neither takes away from the simple 
elegance (and, I believe, validity) of his idea. Professor Langevoort‟s description of legal and 
practical considerations in M&A transactions is accurate, and his solution rings true to me as 
a former M&A practitioner.  A major question exists, however, as to whether his idea is 
practicable.  I maintain that it is and hope, through this response to his essay, to demonstrate 
that promising practical tactics exist to achieve his strategic objectives. 
Professor Langevoort encourages us to educate transactional participants about 
both the nature of observed behavioral norms that impact M&A transactions and the effects 
of the observed norms on those transactions so that transactional participants may engage in 
activities that reinforce desirable behavioral norms and counteract undesirable norms.  I 
stand ready to join in this effort and the overall charge toward practice-based responses to 
behavioral critiques of corporate governance in the M&A context.   
Accordingly, as a means of further effectuating the educational mission suggested 
and commenced by Professor Langevoort in his essay, this paper expresses preliminary 
thoughts on one potential component of the practice-based answer Professor Langevoort 
seeks.  Specifically, this paper asserts that fairness opinions, nearly ubiquitous in M&A 
transactions, can be better used in the M&A transactional process to mitigate or foreclose 
the negative effects of prevalent adverse behavioral norms.  Like Professor Langevoort‟s 
conclusions excerpted above, the idea that fairness opinions may offer opportunities to 
neutralize behavioral norms in M&A transactions is both obvious (because fairness opinions 
are designed to serve a gatekeeping function, protecting both sellers and buyers against 
biased or otherwise inaccurate management price determinations) and counterintuitive (in 
that the investment bankers who typically author fairness opinions, and the corporate 
managers who retain them, have been accused of acting in accordance with behavioral biases 
in rendering and accepting those opinions).  The core idea motivating this paper is that 
fairness opinions, when properly constructed and used, have the potential to provide 
effective gatekeeping in spite of the operation of countervailing behavioral biases. 
Accordingly, this paper begins by briefly reviewing the nature (attributes, benefits 
and detriments), regulation, and utilization of fairness opinions in the M&A transactional 
process, including the ways in which fairness opinions manifest, support, and attempt to 
counteract behavioral norms.  Next, the paper suggests best practices in the construction 
and use of fairness opinions that take into account our knowledge of behavioral psychology 
as it relates to M&A transactions.  The net effect of these best practices is to transform what 
may be unconscious behavioral norms into conscious biases that, once exposed, can be 
confronted and, as desired, mitigated.  The paper ends with a summary conclusion. 
                                                 
4 Id. at 79.  
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II. FAIRNESS OPINIONS IN M&A PRACTICE 
Fairness opinions typically are provided to corporate management by an outside 
financial advisor, such as an investment bank or valuation firm,5 to provide assurance that 
the pricing of a transaction is fair—specifically, that the transaction is fair “from a financial 
point of view.”6  In M&A transactions, these opinions may be provided to the board of 
directors or a committee of the board of directors for the acquiror or the target or both, 
depending on the context.  Fairness opinions tend to have a particular, predictable structure 
and form.7 
When used as part of management‟s deliberative process, fairness opinions have the 
capacity to increase the amount of information available to executives and the board of 
directors, especially independent directors.8  The price verification provided by fairness 
opinions may be critical where a market-based price is unavailable or unreliable.9  In 
addition, fairness opinions represent a way for officers and directors to ensure compliance 
with their fiduciary duties of care (informing themselves of all material information 
reasonably available) and loyalty (including good faith) in M&A transactional decision-
making.  Fairness opinions are not legally mandated, but since the Delaware Supreme 
Court‟s 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom (in which a target‟s board of directors was 
criticized for, among other things, its perfunctory assessment of the pricing of a merger in 
the absence of a fairness opinion),10 they have become omnipresent in M&A transactions of 
                                                 
5 For ease of reference, I will often refer to the authors of fairness opinions as investment banks, although I 
acknowledge that valuation firms and other financial advisors also may render fairness opinions.  I note here, 
however, that the range of services provided by investment banks may make them more likely to have a 
conflicting interest than more narrowly tailored financial services firms.  See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying 
text. 
6 See ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, HANDBOOK OF ADVANCED BUSINESS VALUATION 310 (2000) 
(“A fairness opinion is a letter, prepared by a knowledgeable financial advisory firm (generally an investment 
banking firm or an entity specializing in valuations), that states whether or not a transaction—or the 
consideration or financial terms of a transaction—is fair.  Fairness is assessed from a financial point of view.”); 
Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2006) (“A fairness opinion is an opinion 
provided by an outside advisor, usually, though not necessarily, an investment bank, that a transaction meets a 
threshold level of fairness from a financial perspective.”).  The concept of fairness from a financial point of view 
is imprecise and is not defined in the opinions themselves.  See Steven J. Cleveland, An Economic and Behavioral 
Analysis of Investment Bankers When Delivering Fairness Opinions, 58 ALA. L. REV. 299, 336 (2006); Michael B. Rizik, Jr. 
& Matthew M. Wirgau, Fairness Opinions: No Longer a Laughing Matter, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 233, 239 (2008).  
The clear importance of the “financial point of view” qualifier is to limit the scope of the opinion to matters 
within the expertise of the firm rendering the opinion.  See REILLY & SCHWEIHS, supra. 
7 See Rizik & Wirgau, supra note 6, at 251-56. 
8 See generally Matthew D. Cain & David J. Denis, Do Fairness Opinion Valuations Contain Useful Information?  (Am. 
Fin. Ass‟n 2008 Meetings, Working Paper, Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=971069 (finding 
evidence that fairness opinions provide information useful to directors and investors).  See also Cleveland, supra 
note 6, at 300-01 (explaining in simple terms the information-enhancing role of a fairness opinion in corporate 
transactions); Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1589 (“[A]n unconflicted valuation conducted with rigor and discipline in 
accordance with current academic precepts and without biased manipulation of subjective inputs can materially 
inform as to value.”); Melissa B. Frye & Weishen Wang, Boards, Uncertainty, and the Use of Fairness Opinions, 18 
CORP. GOV.: AN INT‟L REV. 49 (2010) (showing, among other things, that boards with more independent 
directors may seek fairness opinions to enhance their knowledge). 
9 Jeffrey B. Bede, Are Fairness Opinions . . . Fair?, CHESSIECAP, at 3, http://www.chessiecap.com/pdfs/Fairness-
Opinions.pdf (last visited March 21, 2011). 
10 488 A.2d 858, 876-78 (Del. 1985). 
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a certain size.11   
A secondary function of fairness opinions is to provide shareholders with 
transaction pricing information, enabling them to better determine how to exercise rights to 
tender or vote (or dissent and exercise statutory appraisal rights, if available).12  The opinions 
are disclosed and described as part of the publicly available materials for certain public 
company tender offers and for mergers and sales of all or substantially all of a corporation‟s 
assets.13  Some empirical evidence suggests that the existence of a fairness opinion in an 
M&A transaction protects the shareholders of acquiror firms by keeping the premium over 
market prices relatively low.14  Target fairness opinions may be more important than 
acquiror fairness opinions in this regard.  A recent study indicates that voting shareholders of 
an acquiror value the fairness opinion rendered by the target‟s advisor (which typically is less 
biased) more than the fairness opinion of the acquiror‟s advisor in making their voting 
decisions.15 
As a general matter, fairness opinions are designed to ensure that there are effective 
procedural checks on potential managerial and institutional deviations from normative 
wealth maximization.  If, as Professor Langevoort‟s essay suggests, individual cognitive traits 
or biases threaten to impair rational individual and institutional decision-making in M&A 
transactions and neither regulation nor the courts provides fully effective checks on the 
potential for irrational behavior, then a third-party opinion from a reliable source seems like 
a sensible response.  This is a weighty responsibility for the firms that write fairness opinions 
because they serve as reputational intermediaries.15  Both management and shareholders may 
                                                 
11 Professor Frank Partnoy makes this point particularly well:  
[T]he directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom did not follow the then relatively common practice of 
soliciting a fairness opinion from an investment bank. The court in Van Gorkom suggested 
that although such fairness opinions were not required by law, the directors would have 
obtained some advantage in the case if they had obtained a fairness opinion. Thus, Van 
Gorkom created a regulatory entitlement related to fairness opinions.   
Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491, 
523 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
12 See Bede, supra note 9, at 3 (“[T]he fairness opinion serves an important role in providing useful information to 
shareholders….”). 
13 See PETER A. HUNT, STRUCTURING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
338 (4th ed. 2009) (“In transactions that require shareholder approval, the fairness opinion is often included in 
the proxy statement or prospectus that is sent to shareholders seeking their vote in favor of the deal”).  Securities 
and Exchange Commission disclosure rules may mandate disclosure.  See, e.g., Sec‟s & Exch. Comm‟n, Reg. M-A, 
Reports, Opinions, Appraisals and Negotiations, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1015 (2010) (requiring disclosure of the 
existence of and certain information about fairness opinions); Sec‟s & Exch. Comm‟n, Reg. M-A, Exhibits, 17 
C.F.R. § 229.1016 (2010) (requiring that fairness opinions disclosed under Item 1015 be included as exhibits).  
Interestingly, cash tender offers that do not constitute going-private transactions do not invoke these 
requirements.  See Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1590. 
14 See, e.g., Darren J. Kisgen et al., Are Fairness Opinions Fair?  The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 
179 (2009). 
15 See SERGEI PARIJS, FAIRNESS OPINIONS AND LIABILITY: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FAIRNESS 88-89 
(2005) (classifying those who offer fairness opinions as “gatekeepers” and stating that “gatekeepers are also called 
„reputational intermediaries‟”); Jonathan M. Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional 
Curiosities, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 95, 100 (2007) (describing the theory explaining reputational intermediaries and 
citing to investment banker roles in corporate transactions as an example); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure 
and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-09 (2004) (discussing gatekeepers 
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view the perceived stature of these firms and their willingness to render an opinion as a seal 
of approval on the transaction on which the opinion is given.16 
But the proposition that fairness opinions could be important, independent, 
practice-based checks on biased decision-making by officers and directors in M&A 
transactions flies in the face of a substantial body of academic literature questioning the 
actual role and value of fairness opinions in M&A transactions.  The critiques are many and 
varied.17  For example, empirical evidence indicates that acquirors using fairness opinions 
underperform in the short term.18  Acquiror fairness opinions may have a tendency to over-
value the target.19  In addition, fairness opinions have been described as subjective, 
indeterminate, and inconsistent in approach and in the weighting of valuation factors; they 
are not always rendered in accordance with the best practices advocated in practical and 
academic literature.20  Knowledgeable non-scholarly commentary is consistent with these 
findings.21  Overall, questions remain as to whether the benefits of fairness opinions are 
outweighed by their high cost.22 
Perhaps the critique with the most traction relates to the possible effect of 
conflicting interests on the quality of a fairness opinion.  The potential conflicts range from 
those arising from a lack of independence (given that many of the authors of fairness 
opinions are financial advisors to the firm in connection with the transaction for which the 
opinion is written and also have provided and plan to continue providing other financial 
advisory services to the firm) combined with an overall compensation scheme for the 
transaction in the form of a sizable success fee (based on the aggregate transaction value) to 
the existence of actual or possible business interests on both sides of the M&A transaction.23  
The capacity for divided loyalties in this environment seems great.  Yet, there is some 
                                                                                                                                     
as reputational intermediaries and listing investment bankers as among those gatekeepers who serve as 
reputational intermediaries). 
16 I am not, of course, the first to make this observation.  See, e.g., Rizik & Wirgau, supra note 6, at 237 (“A 
fairness opinion is the issuer's „Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval‟ for the constituency seeking it.”). 
17 See Yasuhiro Ohta & Kenton K. Yee, The Fairness Opinion Puzzle: Board Incentives, Information Asymmetry, and 
Bidding Strategy, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 232-33 (2008) (describing three bases for bias in the rendering of fairness 
opinions). 
18 See Kisgen et al., supra note 14, at 180-81; Lucy Huajing Chen  & Heibatollah Sami, Does the Use of Fairness 
Opinions Impair the Acquirers‟ Abnormal Returns? The Litigation Risk Effect 4 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://www.af.polyu.edu.hk/jcae_af/paper2008/concurrent/S.2a%20Sami.pdf). 
19 See Cain & Denis, supra note 8, at 17 (“[T]he valuations of acquirer advisors exceed those of matched target 
advisors by 29%, on average.”). 
20 Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1573-85.  To the subjectivity point, one industry professional aptly describes fairness 
opinions as involving “both art and science.” Bede, supra note 9, at 2. 
21 See, e.g., ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND 
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 374 (2010) (“A fairness opinion is 
usually touted as an independent, unconflicted seal of approval for a deal. But on Wall Street, they are often seen 
as little more than paid rubber stamps.”). 
22 See Barnett, supra note 15, at 146 (“[E]ven routinely employed certification practices may convey little new 
information to contracting parties, thereby doing nothing more on a net social basis than imposing a costly „drag‟ 
on market transactions.”). 
23 See Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1586-88; see also Fairness Opinions and Advisor Independence, AM. APPRAISAL, 2 (Winter 
2010), http://www.american-appraisal.us/userfiles/file/Fairness%20opinions%203222010.pdf (describing 
potential conflicts of interest for financial advisors). 
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dispute about whether conflicts of interest have actual detrimental effects on fairness 
opinions.24  Regardless, research confirms that shareholders may discount the value of 
fairness opinions because they know the advisors rendering the opinions are conflicted.25 
Even assuming the potential or actual existence of conflicts of interest in some 
situations, the benefits of fairness opinions may exceed their costs.  For example, asking for 
a valuation from a financial advisor who is familiar with the firm may provide some 
offsetting benefits, e.g., in the form of a more accurate valuation.26  Advisors with pre-
existing relationships with a firm should have more information about the firm, enabling a 
more accurate (and, potentially, more efficient) valuation.  In addition, certain authors of 
fairness opinions may be more accurate than others.  For example, support exists for the 
contention that fairness opinions authored by top-tier financial advisors signal a higher 
quality transaction.27   
In 2007, in an effort to address the conflict of interest issue, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) imposed new requirements on member firms that render 
fairness opinions.28  These requirements, embodied in FINRA Rule 5150 (originally 
proposed as NASD Rule 2290), comprise disclosure obligations relating to both the member 
firm rendering the fairness opinion and the opinion itself (operative only when “the member 
issuing the fairness opinion knows or has reason to know that the fairness opinion will be 
provided or described to the company's public shareholders”) and mandate that any member 
                                                 
24 Compare Cain & Denis, supra note 8, at 4 (“We conclude, therefore, that there is little evidence that fairness 
opinion valuations are driven by conflicts of interest.”) with Kisgen et al., supra note 14, at 181 (“We find . . . 
evidence that conflicts of interest . . . affect the objectivity and quality of F[airness] O[pinion]s.”).  Specifically, 
the Cain and Denis paper finds “no evidence . . . that opinion providers provide less accurate valuations for 
mergers in which they are paid contingent fees” and “no evidence that unaffiliated third-party investment banks 
provide valuations that are more accurate than affiliated advisors.”  Cain & Denis, supra note 8, at 4.  Kisgen et 
al., on the other hand, “find that acquirers with F[airness] O[pinion] providers that also receive a fee contingent 
on deal completion have significantly lower announcement-period returns” and that in cases involving financial 
opinion advisors “otherwise unaffiliated with the transaction . . . the market does not react negatively to the use of 
these advisors.”  Kisgen et al., supra note 14, at 181.  
25 Anil K. Makhija & Rajesh P. Narayanan, Fairness Opinions in Mergers and Acquisitions 4 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 2007-03-108; Charles A. Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2007-11, 2007), available at 
http://www.terry.uga.edu/finance/docs/narayanan_fairness_opinions.pdf (“Shareholders, aware of the conflict 
of interest facing the advisor, thus rationally discount their valuation of the deal when the advisors provide the 
fairness opinions.”). 
26 See Cain & Denis, supra note 8, at 4 (“advisors with a pre-established relationship with the target” “produce 
significantly lower absolute valuation errors”). 
The results . . . provide some evidence that both acquirer and target advisors produce 
significantly lower absolute valuation errors for transactions in which they have had previous 
business experience with either the target only or both the acquirer and target. This evidence 
supports the view that prior business relationships produce information that is useful in the 
producing more precise fairness opinion valuations. 
Id. at 22. 
27 See Kisgen, supra note 14, at 181 (“The use of top-tier F[airness] O[pinion] advisors on the acquirer side 
reduces the deal premium, while the use of lower-tier FO advisors is associated with a higher probability of 
completing the deal, higher premiums paid, and significantly lower announcement returns.”); Cain & Denis, supra 
note 8, at 4 (“We further find that top-tier investment banks produce significantly lower absolute valuation 
errors.”). 
28 FINRA R. 5150, Fairness Opinions, FINRA Manual, available at http://finra.complinet.com 
/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6832.  
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firm rendering the opinion have written procedures regarding the approval of fairness 
opinions.29  The required disclosures, some of which were formerly voluntary or included 
only in the text of public filings describing the opinion, must be included in the fairness 
opinion itself.30  Admittedly, these new requirements fall short of ensuring the efficacy of 
fairness opinions that may be tainted by a conflict of interest.31  Mandatory disclosure may 
be a necessary yet insufficient response to self-interest,32 and weak process regulation is 
similarly unlikely to have much effect.33 
Finally, even if the critiques regarding fairness opinions can be overcome or 
substantially offset by their positive attributes, it is important to note that investment 
bankers authoring fairness opinions may be subject to the same cognitive biases—the risk 
and loss aversion, overconfidence, availability, and self-serving biases—that operate on 
corporate officers and directors.34  Other biases also may impact the behavior of investment 
banks rendering fairness opinions.35  The existence of these biases may have effects on the 
ability of a fairness opinion author to resist the tug of self-interest or to properly assess the 
reputational risk associated with delivering a “low-quality opinion.”36 Learning, competition, 
monitoring, and other activities and structures may counteract these individual behavioral 
tendencies, but one still must account for the possibility that cognitive biases impact fairness 
opinion decision-making at the institutional, as well as individual, level (Professor 
Langevoort‟s third of the four tall steps that must be climbed to incorporate insights from 
psychology into corporate and securities law) in establishing any remedial measures.37 
In sum, fairness opinions have an entrenched place in the M&A process that makes 
them well positioned to mitigate the effects of cognitive biases on decision-makers.  
However, as currently constituted and regulated, fairness opinions fail to live up to their 
potential.  They may have certain predictable and unpredictable inaccuracies resulting from 
the norms of fairness opinion practice, conflicting interests, and processing errors.  In other 
words, fairness opinions, as a possible check and balance on flawed decision-making in the 
M&A process, exhibit some of the same defects Langevoort and others observe in the M&A 
decision-making context generally.  Yet, there may be ways to enhance the prospect that 
                                                 
29 Id.  
30 See Rizik, Jr. & Wirgau, supra note 6, at 262. 
31 Id. at 265. 
32 See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 67 (“[C]orporate and securities law‟s favorite strategy—more disclosure—often 
fails when up against a well-ingrained, institutionally favored behavioral bias.”).  
33 See Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1595-98 (citation omitted) (commenting on the proposed NASD Rule 2290, later 
codified as FINRA Rule 5150, and concluding that “[t]he rule in its current proposed form is largely uneventful 
and a disappointment given the NASD acknowledgement of the issues before it.”). 
34 See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 324 (citations omitted). 
35 See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (describing dependent gatekeepers, characterizing fairness opinion 
authors as dependent gatekeepers, and identifying biases to which dependent gatekeepers likely are subject). 
36 Cleveland, supra note 6, at 326 (describing how “[t]he cognitive bias regarding loss aversion may lead a bank or 
a banker to deliver to a long-term client an opinion with content pleasing to the client—even if the opinion is of 
low quality—to preserve the relationship with that client” and that the overconfidence, availability, and self-
serving biases “may lessen the disciplinary effect of reputation”). 
37 Id. at 330-34; Langevoort, supra note 1, at 66-67. 
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fairness opinions could have a meaningful role in diminishing the effects of behavioral biases 
on M&A decision-making.  The remainder of this paper is dedicated to that proposition. 
III. ADDING VALUE TO FAIRNESS OPINIONS AS A RESPONSE TO 
BEHAVIORAL BIASES 
It remains for us to determine how to mold this rather promising, yet flawed, 
device—the fairness opinion—into a tool that can be used more effectively to curb cognitive 
biases in the M&A decision-making process.  I posit that a multi-pronged attack on existing 
fairness opinion practice may yield results in this regard.  Two main avenues exist for 
reforming the use of fairness opinions in the M&A process: (1) modifications can be made 
to the form of fairness opinions and the process that creates them or (2) adjustments can be 
made to the way that fairness opinions are employed and reviewed in the M&A decision-
making process.  A number of scholars have addressed the first of these two avenues for 
reform, but not many have approached the latter.  This Part preliminarily outlines a series of 
proposed changes in the contents, construction, use, and assessment of fairness opinions 
that, when taken together, hold promise to enhance the value of fairness opinions as a 
response to cognitive bias in the M&A context. 
A.  Further Changes to the Form of Fairness Opinions 
As earlier noted,38 FINRA Rule 5150 imposes content requirements on fairness 
opinions written by member firms.39  However, it represents a somewhat limited approach, 
catered only to specific aspects of the potential for conflicting interests (and not cognitive 
bias).  Why not, then, consider a similar approach to counteracting bias?  That is precisely 
what Professor James Fanto suggested ten years ago. 
The SEC might consider a disclosure rule that would hold investment 
bankers to a higher standard in their opinions by requiring them to consider 
the potential negative consequences and costs arising from the transaction 
and to quantify the likely negative results of the merger. In the same vein, 
investment bankers could be required to give an opinion that explicitly 
addresses the rationality of the deal from both the acquirer's and target's 
perspective as opposed to their current limited focus on the fairness of the 
exchange ratio. After all, since they are so involved in promoting the mega-
mergers, it is appropriate for them to be enlisted in the effort to achieve a 
comprehensive rationality on the part of boards and shareholders. In 
addition, by expanding their opinions to address the evidence on the 
negative results of mega-mergers, investment bankers would enhance the 
comprehensive rationality of merger decision-making. They would also 
present a stronger scientific rationale than that contained in the watered-
down, self-interested version of financial economics currently used to 
justify their fairness opinions.40 
                                                 
38 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
39 FINRA R. 5150, Fairness Opinion, FINRA Manual, available at http://finra.complinet.com 
/en/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6832. 
40 James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1333, 1398 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
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In his 2001 article, Professor Fanto offers this content-based proposal as one 
among a number of reforms targeted to combat behavioral bias in M&A decision-making.41  
As Professor Langevoort notes in his essay, it is Professor Fanto who demonstrated many 
years ago, in the study presented in that article, that psychological factors impair rationality in 
M&A decision-making.42  Professor Fanto‟s proposal is nicely tailored to the biases he and 
Professor Langevoort observe, and I endorse it.  I would suggest that in the current 
regulatory environment, however, FINRA, rather than (or perhaps in addition to) the SEC, 
may be the appropriate author of the rule and that, in fact, the requirements proposed by 
Professor Fanto be added to FINRA Rule 5150.  In this regard, consideration should be 
given to counteracting bias in fairness opinions rendered by both investment bankers and 
others in both public and private transactions. 
B.  Changes in the Way Fairness Opinions are Made 
Changing the form of fairness opinions will necessarily involve modifications in the 
process used to construct those opinions.  To support the content-based changes proposed 
by Professor Fanto and increase the overall accuracy of fairness opinions in combating 
cognitive bias in M&A decision-making, what might a good process look like?  Best practices 
used in other professions in rendering opinions may provide useful guidance.   
Various other reputational intermediaries (gatekeepers)43 issue opinions in 
connection with business transactions, including principally lawyers and accountants.  
Lawyers are not subject to externally imposed restrictions on the form and content of their 
opinions (although custom and practice guidance provide important, yet nonbinding, 
parameters and regulatory authorities, including the SEC, and stock exchanges may require 
the coverage of specified items in specific transactional circumstances),44 and the effect of a 
legal opinion on the M&A decision-making process is negligible.45  Auditors, on the other 
hand, must comply with significant rules that dictate the form and substance of their audit 
opinions,46 and their opinions carry great weight in M&A decision-making.47  Before the 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Langevoort, supra note 1, at 68. 
43 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
44 Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary 
Investigation), 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 71 (2005) (“Although closing opinion letters are not generally regulated, 
they have become fairly standardized in forms that are widely available.”).  Practice conventions are important to 
legal opinion practice.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Comment, Can Lawyers Wear Blinders? Gatekeepers and Third-Party 
Opinions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 59, 62 (2005) (referencing bar association activities relating to the form of third-party 
legal opinions and opinion committee practice). 
45 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (2005) 
(“[C]lients generally have more and better information about the consequences of a transaction, other than the 
transaction's legality. The clients therefore are better positioned to make business decisions.”).  Professor 
Schwarcz also writes: 
[N]either third-party legal opinions nor legal opinions addressed to clients purport to 
evaluate a transaction's inherent business wisdom. At least heretofore, an opining lawyer has 
had no duty to evaluate the business merits of the underlying transaction beyond the 
obvious ethical and legal obligations of not knowingly furthering a fraudulent transaction.  
Id. at 11 (footnotes omitted). Undoubtedly, however, because they are conditions to closing transactions 
(including M&A transactions), legal opinions facilitate completion of the transaction.  Id. at 28. 
46 See id. at 20.  Professor Schwarcz succinctly describes those rules: “[T]he criteria for fair presentation of a 
company's financial condition and results of operations are already dictated by generally accepted accounting 
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advent of FINRA Rule 5150, the opinion process for investment banks rendering fairness 
opinions looked much like that for lawyers issuing legal opinions.  Perhaps the audit process 
is a better model for fairness opinion practice. 
A 2006 article written by Professor Arthur Laby supports this notion.48  In his 
article, Professor Laby divides the world of gatekeepers into two categories: dependent and 
independent.49  Under Laby‟s taxonomy, investment banks authoring fairness opinions (like 
lawyers issuing legal opinions) historically would have been classified as dependent 
gatekeepers—reputational intermediaries that “provide advice and recommendations to 
assist a client in meeting its goals.”50  Dependent gatekeepers are distinguishable from 
independent gatekeepers (which generally include auditors) by their fiduciary duties, which 
bind them to their clients through trust and confidence.51  Professor Laby observes that 
gatekeepers are subject to unconscious bias in performing their roles (although he does not 
focus on the M&A context and does not discuss fairness opinions).52 
A dependent gatekeeper is accountable to its client and knows what the client 
wants.53  As a result, the advice of dependent gatekeepers tends to be directional, and 
dependent gatekeepers tend to be committed to a particular outcome that is beneficial for 
the client.54 
People generally are motivated to seek approval from their audience and are 
biased in favor of conclusions that conform to the audience's views. When 
the views of the audience are known to the decision maker before she 
forms an opinion, she will redirect her opinion to conform to them. 
Directional goals take over. People adopt positions that are likely to be 
pleasing to those to whom they are accountable.55 
This approach decreases accuracy in the gatekeeper‟s decision-making.  “[A]fter committing 
to a decision, if called upon to justify the choice, people are highly motivated to avoid self-
criticism and justify their original decision.”56  Moreover, “[d]ependent gatekeepers are likely 
                                                                                                                                     
principles (GAAP). GAAP comprises a set of standards for financial accounting and reporting, officially 
recognized as authoritative by the SEC, that provide the „credibility, transparency, and comparability‟ needed for 
"the efficient functioning of the economy."  Id. (footnotes omitted).  
47 See Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors' Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989, 991 (2003) (“[A]uditors act as 
gatekeepers. Certain major transactions involving potentially large information asymmetries cannot get off the 
ground without audit opinions, either as a matter of business necessity or of law.”). 
48 Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006). 
49 Id. at 122. 
50 Id. at 127. 
51 Id. at 124-26 & 128-32 (comparing and contrasting the attributes and roles of auditors and lawyers). 
52 Id. at 135-40.  See also Cleveland, supra note 6, at 324-30. 
53 Laby, supra note 48, at 142. 
54 Id. at 144. 
55 Id. at 141. 
56 Id. at 143-44.  “Psychologists refer to this as retrospective rationality or defensive bolstering.”  Id. at 144 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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to be more prone to bias through anchoring and adjustment than independent 
gatekeepers.”57 
Conversely, independent gatekeepers are principally accountable to a greater public 
outside of the client—an audience the gatekeeper does not know.58  “When the audience's 
views are unknown, conformity is not possible and accuracy goals predominate.  In that 
case, opinion authors are more likely to consider multiple objectives and engage in a more 
thoughtful, deliberate, self-critical analysis.”59  Independent gatekeepers are committed to 
processes rather than outcomes.60  “Process accountability . . . leads to a better decision 
making process, such as more consideration of alternatives and less self-justification.”61 
It is important to acknowledge that even independent gatekeepers may not be able 
to maintain complete independence from their clients in performing their work.  Certain 
scholars, for example, question the ability of auditors to be truly independent. 
How realistic is the assumption that auditors—even those of high 
integrity—can provide impartial judgments that respond to the interests of 
creditors, stockholders, and the general public, rather than to the interests 
of the companies that hire them?  Psychological research points to an 
inescapable conclusion: such impartiality is impossible . . . .62 
Specifically, auditors manifest a self-serving bias that is enhanced by, among other things, the 
faceless, “statistical,” nature of the shareholders their opinions serve.63  As a result, auditors 
may have an interest (conscious or subconscious) in adopting positions that are favorable to 
their clients in a manner similar to the interest (even if not the obligation) of lawyers, 
especially given the fact that auditors are paid by clients—not by the government, third 
parties, shareholders, or the general public—for the audits they perform.64   
Nevertheless, Professor Laby does describe an important structural difference 
between the type of gatekeeping performed by dependent gatekeepers (like lawyers), on the 
one hand, and independent gatekeepers (for example, auditors), on the other.  The disparate 
fiduciary duties that Professor Laby identifies appear to be the key factor.  A lawyer, as a 
                                                 
57 Id. at 146. 
58 Id. at 142. 
59 Id. at 141 (footnote omitted). 
60 See id. 
61 Id. at 146 (footnote omitted). 
62 Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38 SLOAN MGT. REV. 89, 90 (1997).  See also Sean 
M. O‟Connor, Be Careful What You Wish for: How Accountants and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence , 
45 B.C. L. REV 741, 820-21 (2004) (noting the capacity of consulting engagements and other non-accounting 
work to detract from auditor independence); Sean M. O‟Connor, The Inevitability of Enron and the Impossibility of 
“Auditor Independence” under the Current Audit System (Mar. 1, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=303181 
(“[T]he accounting firms are supposed to be „independent‟ of the audit client and act on behalf of the public, not 
the audit client. The problem is that, however well this audit system worked at its inception, it is fundamentally 
flawed now, such that as a practical matter it is impossible for auditors to be „independent‟ of their audit 
clients.”); Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1597, 1637-53 (2000) (summarizing scholarly studies and commentary relating to accountant and auditor 
independence). 
63 See Bazerman et al., supra note 62, at 91-92. 
64 See O‟Connor, supra note 62, at 2-3; Prentice, supra note 62, at 1629-37. 
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dependent gatekeeper, has a duty of loyalty to his or her client and an obligation to represent 
the client zealously.65  An auditor, as an independent gatekeeper,  
performs a different role. By certifying the public reports that collectively 
depict a corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a 
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the 
client. The independent public accountant performing this special function 
owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as 
well as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands 
that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times 
and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.66 
Surely, these distinct operative client duties are meaningful; they clearly belie different 
gatekeeping roles.  The differences in these roles may not be adequately considered and 
weighed in corporate decision-making (including M&A negotiations and deliberations).  
While the opinions of neither a dependent nor an independent gatekeeper are free from 
inaccuracies, the broad-based loyalties and process orientation of independent gatekeepers 
seemingly have a greater propensity to create accurate opinions.  
How do investment banks issuing fairness opinions fit into Professor Laby‟s system 
of categorization in light of FINRA Rule 5150?  Do they continue to be classified most 
accurately as dependent gatekeepers?  There has been and is some dispute as to whether an 
investment bank issuing a fairness opinion does or should owe a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders of its client.67  It may nevertheless owe a fiduciary duty to its client.68  
Moreover, FINRA Rule 5150 may be interpreted to reflect the existence of or create a duty 
of trust that is fiduciary in nature.  The investment bank knows what its client wants and is 
committed to an outcome that gives the client what it wants.  In other words, there is a 
commitment to finding that the subject transaction is fair from a financial point of view in 
order to facilitate consummation of that transaction.  Thus, despite the advent of FINRA 
Rule 5150, the investment bank that renders a fairness opinion still appears to be more of a 
dependent gatekeeper, as categorized by Professor Laby. 
The observations made by Professor Laby in his article indicate that it may be 
possible to enhance the accuracy of fairness opinions by making investment banks more 
accountable to shareholders, an audience the banker does not know (as opposed to the 
                                                 
65 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010); id. at R. 1.7. 
66 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-818 (1984). 
67 Compare Baker v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 656 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236-37 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding “that special 
circumstances existed to create a fiduciary relationship apart from the terms of the contract”) with Joyce v. 
Morgan Stanley & Co., 538 F.3d 797, 800-03 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding no fiduciary duty owed to shareholders by 
an investment bank issuing a fairness opinion).  See also CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Credit 
Lyonnais, 270 A.D.2d 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2000) (finding no fiduciary duty to investors where the 
terms of the contracts between the parties “flatly contradicted” the exitence of one); Fulco v. Cont‟l Cablevision, 
Inc., No. 89-1342 S, 1990 WL 120689, at *3 (D. Mass. June 19, 1990) (indicating that an investment bank did not 
owe a fiduciary duty to a selling corporation‟s shareholders); PARIJS, supra note 15, at 153-57 (describing legal 
actions involving fiduciary duty claims by shareholders against investment banks issuing fairness opinions); Park 
McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 
EMORY L.J. 163, 192 n.40 (1997). 
68 See Bear Stearns & Co. v. Daisy Sys. Corp. (In re Daisy Sys. Corp.), 97 F.3d 1171, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Fulco, 1990 WL 120689, at *4; M. Breen Haire, Comment: The Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Bankers in 
Change-of-Control Transactions: In Re Daisy Systems Corp., 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1999). 
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client‟s board of directors), and by better insuring that the investment banks rendering 
fairness opinions are committed to processes rather than outcomes.69  Under current law, 
given the lack of a clear duty of investment banks to shareholders and the absence of a direct 
contractual relationship between the investment bank and the shareholders, “the exact scope 
of an investment bank's liability to stockholders for the rendering of an „incorrect‟ fairness 
opinion is still uncertain and subject to much judicial and academic debate.”70  Some have 
proposed that investment banks that issue faulty fairness opinions be held strictly liable for 
inaccuracies in their fairness opinions.71  While this approach does make fairness opinion 
authors accountable to shareholders, it would result in increased transaction costs to cover 
the increased risk of litigation and may encourage investment banks to be committed to 
conservative outcomes.  Liability for negligence may create fewer perverse incentives and 
better align accountability of investment banks in fairness opinion practice with the liability 
of accountants in audit practice.72  In general, the idea would be to refrain from treating 
effects on shareholders as externalities and to implement practices that take investment 
banks further away from being dependent, directional, outcome-committed reputational 
intermediaries.  The goal would be to mitigate undesirable biases and increase information 
quality in fairness opinions by fostering independence through accountability to shareholders 
and process commitment. 
C.  Changes in the Way Fairness Opinions are Used and Assessed 
Finally, a comprehensive resolution to issues associated with bias in M&A decision-
making also should focus on how to improve the process relating to the boards of directors‟ 
use and assessment of fairness opinions in M&A transactions.  Boards of directors should be 
both “demanding and critical” in their review of fairness opinions.73 This focus may be 
difficult to implement, however, since it means changing the way the board of directors does 
business—and doing that pervasively.  But, as Professor Langevoort suggests, lawyers and 
accountants can help.74  A board of directors, under the guidance of its advisors, can 
institute better overall cultural norms and provide a more rigorous analysis of the fairness 
opinion and the materials supporting that opinion.  Professor Davidoff offers a statement of 
best practices in this regard. 
A fairness opinion delivered orally or in writing by the preparer at a board 
meeting is almost always, at least in a corporate control transaction, 
accompanied by a “board book.” The board book details the underlying 
analyses conducted by the opiner to arrive at and conclude financial 
fairness. It is here that the meat of the investment banker‟s work lies. A 
well-advised board will review this book in connection with their [sic] 
receipt of a fairness opinion and question the bankers as to their derivation 
                                                 
69 See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text. 
70 See Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1568 n.38. 
71 See PARIJS, supra note 15, at 88. 
72 See C. Richard Baker & Deborah Prentice, The Evolution of Auditor Liability Under Common Law, 8 J. FORENSIC 
ACCT. 183 (2007); Jay M. Feinman, Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, 31 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 17 (2003); J. Keaton Grubbs & Jack R. Ethridge, Jr., Auditor Negligence Liability to Third Parties 
Revisited, 10 J. LEGAL, ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 75 (2007). 
73 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
74 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
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of fairness. It is in these actual analyses that the meaning and worth, if any, 
of a fairness opinion lies.75 
In order for a board of directors to ascertain methodically the “meaning and 
worth”76 of a fairness opinion, legal and other advisors to the board of directors should 
develop and evolve a useful set of questions for assessing the accuracy and integrity of 
fairness opinions.  Because fairness opinions are expert opinions, I suggest that an 
appropriate model for these questions derives from a checklist of five basic questions 
assembled and recommended by one of my colleagues for use by judges in evaluating the 
admission of expert testimony in proving lost profits—a situation in which similar biases 
may operate on the opinion author.77  In a 2007 article,78 Professor Bob Lloyd offered the 
following questions as a nonexclusive list for use by judges in that context:  
 
 Is the expert qualified for this analysis? 
 How reliable is the underlying data? 
 Are the expert's assumptions supported by the record? 
 Does the expert deal adequately with facts inconsistent with the expert's theory? 
 Has the expert considered alternative scenarios?79 
 
These inquiries are consistent with the intents and purposes of FINRA Rule 5150 (which 
focuses on disclosure and process), Professor Fanto‟s proposed disclosure rule, and a re-
framing of fairness opinion authors as independent gatekeepers.  Moreover, the answers to 
these questions should help “participants in the transactional process . . . to better 
understand . . . how, why, and under what circumstances there is reason to worry.”80  
1.  Expert Qualifications 
In asking the first of the five questions, boards of directors should look for evidence 
of specialized skills that may be applicable to the transaction and valuation methodology at 
issue.  Although the overall qualifications of an investment bank rendering a fairness opinion 
generally are not an issue (since valuation is a general skill in the toolkit of financial advisors), 
certain types of valuation—particularly asset-based valuation techniques—may benefit from 
more focused expertise.  It is important that boards of directors assess the type and relative 
size of the transaction, as well as the types of valuation methods used by the author of the 
opinion, to determine whether the substance of all or part of the fairness opinion extends 
beyond the author‟s areas of expertise and to meaningfully question that expertise in light of 
the amount of money at issue. 
                                                 
75 Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1568-69 (footnotes omitted). 
76 Id. at 1569 (footnote omitted). 
77 See Prentice, supra note 62, at 1625-27 (describing the operation of the self-serving bias in this context). 
Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 67 TENN. L. REV. 909, 940-47 (2000) (discussing 
compensation-related bias in expert witness testimony). 
78 Robert M. Lloyd, Proving Lost Profits After Daubert: Five Questions Every Court Should Ask Before Admitting Expert 
Testimony, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 379 (2007). 
79 Id. at 380. 
80 Langevoort, supra note 1, at 79.  
2011]  A MORE CRITICAL USE OF FAIRNESS OPINIONS AS A PRACTICAL APPROACH 95 
 TO THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
Where the amount at stake is relatively small, it is not fair to require a party 
to conduct a nationwide search to find the individual best qualified to opine 
on the particular issue, especially when there may be several distinct areas . . 
. that might call for different areas of expertise and thus require different 
experts. On the other hand, where there are tens or hundreds of millions of 
dollars at stake and the party clearly has the resources to find and hire the 
people best qualified to testify, a court should not accept less. The fact that 
counsel chose someone not among the top people in the field should lead 
the court to suspect that the better-qualified experts would have given less-
favorable testimony.81 
Ideally and typically, boards of directors would make this assessment before engaging a firm 
to render a fairness opinion for an M&A transaction.  It would behoove the board to revisit 
the issue, however, at the time the opinion is rendered and being considered by the board. 
2.  Data Reliability 
The second question, regarding the reliability of the data underlying the fairness 
opinion, enables the board of directors to explore where the factual information supporting 
the opinion came from.  Did the client provide the information?  Which personnel of the 
client participated in the gathering, distillation, and synthesis of the data needed?  How 
knowledgeable is each about the data that was supplied?  Was any of the data independently 
verified by an audit or other similar means of certification that could be obtained cost-
effectively?  Is the “data . . . „of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field‟”?82  Members of the board of directors could use the answers to these questions to 
assess the integrity (completeness and accuracy) of, and potential for bias in, the data used to 
generate the opinion.  The board of directors may want to arrange to interview the personnel 
involved in assembling and generating the applicable data or to otherwise test its accuracy 
and completeness. 
3.  Support for Assumptions 
Additionally, the board of directors should inquire whether the assumptions the 
fairness opinion authors make are fair based on the underlying data and other facts.  Fairness 
opinion assumptions not founded in fact may mislead the board of directors.83  In addition, 
“testimony that relies on multiple assumptions should be viewed with extreme skepticism. 
Where one estimate is piled on another, the uncertainty is magnified . . . .”84  The board of 
directors must be careful, however, to assess the relative importance of different 
assumptions to the opinion before condemning an opinion due to faulty assumptions.  
[U]nsupported assumptions should not be fatal if the assumptions were not 
necessary to the expert's testimony or if the effect of their not being correct 
would not have had a major impact. The American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants has dealt with the question of assumptions in the 
context of auditors' reports on financial statements: “[T]he attention 
                                                 
81 Lloyd, supra note 78, at 391 (footnotes omitted). 
82 Id. at 391-92 (footnote omitted). 
83 Cf. id. at 399-400 (describing the need to exclude expert testimony based on faulty assumptions because of its 
propensity to mislead). 
84 Id. at 409. 
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devoted to the appropriateness of a particular assumption should be 
commensurate with the likely relative impact of that assumption on the 
prospective results. Assumptions with greater impact should receive more 
attention than those with less impact.”85 
Through this process of testing and weighing assumptions, the board of directors can better 
understand and assess the overall validity of the fairness opinion.  
4.  Treatment of Inconsistent Facts 
The fourth question asks the board of directors to challenge the opinion giver‟s 
analytical integrity.  “Where there are facts inconsistent with the expert's theory or model, 
the expert cannot just ignore them.  Sometimes the expert will be able to make a reasonable 
argument that the contrary data is wrong or that it does not apply to the question he or she 
is addressing.”86  But where the investment bank or valuation firm cannot either identify or 
explain data inconsistent with its valuation analysis or opinion or where it hides or 
inappropriately discounts inconsistent data, the board of directors should be skeptical of the 
opinion‟s accuracy and overall integrity. 
5.  Consideration of Alternatives 
Directors can learn a lot about a fairness opinion by inquiring about what is not in 
the opinion.  Thus, the fifth question focuses on the investment bank‟s consideration of 
alternative scenarios.  There are many different ways to ask about “the road not taken.”87  
Which valuation methods were considered and not used?  Why were they excluded?  What 
data and assumptions were considered and then discarded in the valuation and opinion 
drafting process?  What happens to the analysis reflected in the opinion when certain 
assumptions are relaxed or altered?  The content of these questions on alternatives 
necessarily overlaps with that in preceding questions, but it provides necessary completeness 
and closure to the board‟s analysis of the fairness opinion author and the opinion itself.  If 
the board of directors is empowered with alternatives, then it can better assess, for example, 
whether the assumptions the fairness opinion author made are fair.88  Moreover, exploring 
alternative scenarios “alleviates the false impression of certainty”89 that a fairness opinion 
may give, revealing the true nature of the opinion as “both art and science.”90  A firm 
rendering a fairness opinion may, however, offer only the alternative scenarios that bolster 
                                                 
85 Id. (footnote omitted). 
86 Id. at 410-11 (footnote omitted). 
87 This is an obvious, shameless reference to the famous poem of the same name.  ROBERT FROST, The Road 
Not Taken, in MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9, 9 (1916).  For those who may not have read this literary work recently, in 
the poem, the traveler comes to a fork in the road and stops to take a long look down one path before taking the 
other.  See id. 
88 Cf. Lloyd, supra note 78, at 421-22 (“[W]hen the assumptions underlying the more extreme scenarios have been 
shown to be doubtful, [the board can] choose a scenario based upon a more supportable assumption.”). 
89 Id. at 422. 
90 See Bede, supra note 9, at 2. 
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its original opinion.  So, it is important not to rely on this singular line of inquiry when 
assessing the accuracy and integrity of the opinion.91 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In his essay, Professor Langevoort presents a convincing picture of the many roles 
that cognitive biases play in M&A decision-making.  As he notes, scholars have written 
precious little on behavioral finance in this context; they—we—could and should do more 
theoretical and empirical work on the effect of bias on individual and institutional decision-
making in the M&A context.  Additional empirical work especially should add meaningful 
information and analysis to the existing story that Professor Langevoort tells.  Yet, even in 
the absence of further scholarly work to support Professor Langevoort‟s conclusions, his 
observations about behavioral biases in M&A practice and the difficulty in applying 
behavioral psychology in this context make important scholarly contributions to behavioral 
and corporate finance. 
However, in assessing the fourth tall step in his quest to plausibly apply behavioral 
science to M&A decision-making—i.e., determining appropriate interventions to address the 
possibility of non-rational decision-making—Professor Langevoort makes another 
significant contribution.  He suggests that we turn to elements of practice and process and to 
the actions of transaction participants to supplement an existing legal and regulatory system 
that offers an inadequate response to observed biases in M&A decision-making.  This paper 
picks up that thread running through Professor Langevoort‟s essay and begins exploring the 
potential for individual and team (as well as, potentially, organizational) learning curves 
described by Professor Eric Sundstrom in his responsive paper92 by suggesting that fairness 
opinion practice, a part of almost every public company M&A transaction, can be reformed 
to better respond to the cognitive biases that plague M&A.   
Specifically, this paper suggests that changes in the contents, construction, use, and 
assessment of fairness opinions may better enable fairness opinions to counteract the 
potential and actual biases of corporate management and shareholders in M&A decision-
making.  This is, avowedly, a very limited thesis; changes to fairness opinions and related 
practices are not sufficient in and of themselves to implement Professor Langevoort‟s vision.  
Rather, the changes to fairness opinion practice set forth here represent only one possible 
approach among many potential practice-oriented interventions.  One might say that it is an 
incremental step toward full achievement of the fourth tall step described in Professor 
Langevoort‟s essay.  
In concluding his 2001 article on behavioral psychology and M&A decision-making, 
Professor Fanto stated the following about his own ideas for modifying M&A decision-
making: 
With more detailed empirical research, the reform proposals should make 
board members focus on negative consequences of the transaction and 
should stimulate more debate in the board room. Board members will then 
be more likely to address better the influence of specific psychological 
                                                 
91 Cf. Lloyd, supra note 78, at 422 (“Presenting alternative scenarios is of course no cure-all. . . . Experts can still 
present several extreme scenarios, giving the least outrageous of them an appearance of plausibility by labeling it 
the „conservative‟ scenario.”). 
92 Eric Sundstrom, Tall Steps, Slippery Slopes & Learning Curves in the Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 
12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 99 (2011). 
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factors. Moreover, much legal improvement may naturally result if those 
who make legal decisions become more aware of the influences of 
psychological and behavioral factors on merger decision-making.93 
Although I cannot speak for Professor Langevoort, in my view, this is the essence 
of what we (he, together with Professor Sundstrom and me) are building toward in our 
papers.  I hope that others will add to these ideas as time advances and enable us to finish 
climbing Professor Langevoort‟s fourth tall step. 
                                                 
93 Fanto, supra note 40, at 1401. 
